L Number	Hits	Search Text	DB	T:
2	0	weather and personal and penomenological and system	USPAT:	Time stamp
3	0	-	US-PGPUB	2002/06/10 17:54
	J	weather and personal and penomenological and system	USPAT; US-PGPUB;	2002/06/10 17:55
4	0		DERWENT	
7	0	weather and penomenological and system	USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:55
			US-PGPUB; DERWENT	
1	85	weather and (data\$4) and multimedia and grid\$4	USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:55
			US-PGPUB	1

	lmage Doc. Displayed	PI
1	US 20020069220	
2	US 20020069020	
3	US 20020065585	
4	US 20020060750	
5	US 20020059148	
6	US 20020056083	
7	US 20020042747	
8	US 20020035726	
9	US 20020035497	
10	US 20020026496	
11	US 20020018124	
12	US 20010029410	
13	US 20010021887	
14	US 20010020202	
15	US 20010003846	
16	US 6392664	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
17	\boxtimes		US 6380959 B1	31 20020430 17	
18		Ø	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29
19	×		US 6339707 B1	20020115	11
20			US 6336030 B1	20020101	15
21	×		US 6330497 B1	20011211	30
22	×		US 6323980 B1	20011127	26
23			US 6321158 B1	20011120	92
24	×		US 6314163 B1	20011106	35
25	⊠	\boxtimes	US 6307573 B1	20011023	41
26	×		US 6282464 B1	20010828	32
27	⊠		US 6278456 B1	20010821	15
28			US 6233506 B1	20010515	29

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
17	Web calendar architecture and uses thereof	345/853	345/808
18	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414
19	Method and system for providing wideband communications to mobile users in a satellite-based network	455/427	455/12.1; 455/13.3; 455/429
20	Method and system for providing satellite coverage using fixed spot beams and scanned spot beams	455/13.2	455/12.1; 455/13.3; 455/427
21	Multimedia technique for operating devices in a vehicle	701/1	345/7; 701/29
22	Hybrid picocell communication system	359/159	359/154; 359/155; 359/172
23	Integrated routing/mapping information	701/201	340/995; 342/357.09; 701/209; 701/211
24	Hybrid universal broadband telecommunications using small radio cells interconnected by free-space optical links	379/56.2	359/109; 359/152; 455/449
25	Graphic-information flow method and system for visually analyzing patterns and relationships	345/764	345/440; 345/803; 345/804; 345/854; 705/26; 707/512
26	Technique for effectively providing audio information in a vehicle	701/1	340/988; 340/990; 701/200; 701/211; 701/36
27	Web calendar architecture and uses thereof		345/963
28	Technique for effectively locating an object	701/1	307/10.2; 340/426; 342/357.07; 342/357.09; 455/404; 701/207

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
17		Wang, Shou-Chung et al.							
18		Burfeind, Craig et al.							
19		Wainfan, S. Lynne et al.							
20		Houston, Sam W. et al.							
21		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.							
22		Bloom, Scott H.							
23		DeLorme, David M. et al.							
24		Acampora, Anthony							
25		Barros, Barbara L.							
26		Obradovich, Michael L.							
27		Wang, Shou-Chung et al.							
28		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.			ŗ				

		
	lmage Doc. Displayed	PI
17	US 6380959	
18	US 6360172	
19	US 6339707	
20	US 6336030	
21	US 6330497	
22	US 6323980	
23	US 6321158	
24	US 6314163	
25	US 6307573	
26	US 6282464	
27	US 6278456	
28	US 6233506	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
29			US 6215898 B1	20010410	224
30			US 6202060 B1	20010313	48
31	×		US 6199082 B1	20010306	58
32			US 6175782 B1	20010116	28
33	×		US 6169954 B1	20010102	32
34	×		US 6157935 A	20001205	
35	×		US 6144954 A	20001107	
36	\boxtimes		US 6144402 A	20001107	
37	\boxtimes		US 6141034 A	20001031	
38	×		US 6133909 A	20001017	
39	⊠		US 6131060 A	20001010	
40	\boxtimes		US 6105060 A	20000815	18
41	\boxtimes		US 6078946 A	20000620	

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
29	Data processing system and method	382/154	348/47; 382/106; 382/107; 382/278; 382/303; 382/304
30	Data management system	707/3	707/104.1
31	Method for delivering separate design and content in a multimedia publishing system	707/522	707/515
32	System and method for adjusting climate control in vehicles	701/1	165/11.1; 165/203; 165/205; 165/208; 165/211; 236/49.3; 237/2A; 454/75; 701/36
33	Intelligent public transit system using dual-mode vehicles	701/117	701/23
34	Remote data access and management system	707/503	382/187
35	Automatic development of computer software	706/62	706/46; 706/61
36	Internet transaction acceleration	725/109	348/552; 380/212; 380/242
37	Immersive imaging method and apparatus	348/36	348/48
38	Method and apparatus for searching a guide using program characteristics	345/721	348/906; 725/45; 725/46
39	Method and system for adjusting settings of vehicle functions	701/49	307/10.1; 340/461; 701/1; 701/36
40	System for providing global portable internet access using low earth orbit satellite and satellite direct radio broadcast system	709/219	725/63
41	System and method for management of connection oriented networks	709/200	709/238; 709/241

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
29		Woodfill, John Iselin et al.							
30	·	Tran, Bao Q.							
31		Ferrel, Patrick J. et al.							
32		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.							
33		McCrary, Homer T.							
34		Tran, Bao Q. et al.							
35		Li, Chou H.							
36		Norsworthy, John P. et al.							
37		McCutchen, David							
38		Schein, Steven Michael et al.							
39		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.							
40		Rothblatt, Martine A.							
41		Johnson, William A.							

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
29	US 6215898	
30	US 6202060	
31	US 6199082	
32	US 6175782	
33	US 6169954	
34		
35		
36		
37		
38		
39		
40	US 6105060	
41		

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
42	\boxtimes		US 6049593 A	20000411	
43			US 6032041 A	20000229	
44	\boxtimes		US 6026195 A	20000215	
45	×		US 6018343 A	20000125	
46	×		US 6014184 A	20000111	
47	×		US 6009355 A	19991228	
48	\boxtimes		US 6005980 A	19991221	
49			US 5991735 A	19991123	30
50	Ø		US 5963746 A	19991005	
51	×		US 5963745 A	19991005	
52	⊠		US 5950543 A	19990914	40
53	☒		US 5948040 A	19990907	
54			US 5907704 A	19990525	
55	Ø		US 5880864 A	19990309	

06/10/2002, EAST Version: 1.03.0002

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef		
42	Hybrid universal broadband telecommunications using small radio cells interconnected by free-space optical links	379/56.2	359/109; 359/152		
43	Method and system for providing wideband communications to mobile users in a satellite-based network	455/427	455/12.1; 455/13.3		
44	Motion estimation and compensation of video object planes for interlaced digita video	382/236	348/578		
45	Web calendar architecture and uses thereof	345/733	345/749; 345/751; 345/963		
46	Electronic television program guide schedule system and method with data feed access	348/731	348/564; 348/569; 348/906		
47	Multimedia information and control system for automobiles	701/1	340/815.4; 345/7; 701/29		
48	Motion estimation and compensation of video object planes for interlaced digital video	382/236			
49	Computer program apparatus for determining behavioral profile of a computer user	705/10	705/1		
50	Fully distributed processing memory element	712/20	709/238; 712/14		
51	APAP I/O programmable router	712/13	712/10; 712/12; 712/14		
52	Evacuated tube transport	104/138.1	104/130.05; 104/27; 104/28		
53	Travel reservation information and planning system	701/201	340/990; 701/208; 701/211; 705/5		
54	Hierarchical encapsulation of instantiated objects in a multimedia authoring system including internet accessible objects	717/100	717/123		
55	Advanced optical fiber communications network	359/124	359/118; 359/125; 359/167		

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
42		Acampora, Anthony							
43		Wainfan, S. Lynne et al.							
44		Eifrig, Robert O. et al.							
45		Wang, Shou-Chung et al.							
46		Knee, Robert Alan et al.							
47		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.							
48		Eifrig, Robert O. et al.							
49		Gerace, Thomas A.							
50		Barker, Thomas Norman et al.							
51		Collins, Clive Allan et al.							
52		Oster, Daryl							
53		DeLorme, David M. et al.							
54		Gudmundson, Norman K. et al.							
55		Williams, Larry et al.							

06/10/2002, EAST Version: 1.03.0002

	T	$\overline{}$
	Image Doc. Displayed	РТ
42		
43		
44		
45		
46		
47		
48		
49	US 5991735	
50		
51		
52	US 5950543	
53	***************************************	
54		
55		

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
56			US 5875108 A	19990223	110
57			US 5864415 A	19990126	
58			US 5860073 A	19990112	
59			US 5850218 A	19981215	
60	⊠		US 5848396 A	19981208	31
61			US 5848373 A	19981208	
62			US 5842031 A	19981124	67
63			US 5808767 A	19980915	21
64			US 5802492 A	19980901	63
65			US 5796945 A	19980818	14
66			US 5794059 A	19980811	68

06/10/2002, EAST Version: 1.03.0002

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
56	Ergonomic man-machine interface incorporating adaptive pattern recognition based control system	700/17	382/181; 382/190; 700/83
57	Fiber optic network with wavelength-division-multiplexed transmission to customer premises	359/125	359/173; 370/907
58	Style sheets for publishing system	707/522	707/513; 707/516; 707/526
59	Inter-active program guide with default selection control	725/45	348/906; 725/102; 725/33; 725/41; 725/43; 725/53; 725/61; 725/8
60	Method and apparatus for determining behavioral profile of a computer user	705/10	705/1; 725/14; 725/46
61	Computer aided map location system	701/200	340/990; 340/995; 342/357.13; 701/208; 701/212
62	Advanced parallel array processor (APAP)	712/23	
63	Fiber optic network with wavelength-division-multiplexed transmission to customer premises	359/152	359/125; 359/167
64	Computer aided routing and positioning system	455/456	340/990; 340/995; 701/201; 701/208; 701/211; 701/213
35	Idle time multimedia viewer method and apparatus for collecting and displaying information according to user defined indicia	709/219	345/716
66	N-dimensional modified hypercube	712/10	712/1; 712/11; 712/12; 712/13; 712/15

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
56		Hoffberg, Steven M. et al.							
57		Williams, Larry et al.							
58		Ferrel, Patrick J. et al.							
59		LaJoie, Mike L. et al.							
60		Gerace, Thomas A.							
61		DeLorme, David M. et al.							
62		Barker, Thomas Norman et al.	×						
63		Williams, Larry et al.	☒						
64		DeLorme, David M. et al.	×						
65		Tarabella, Robert M.	⊠						
66		Barker, Thomas Norman et al.	\boxtimes						

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
56	US 5875108	
57		
58		
59		
60	US 5848396	
61		
62	US 5842031	
63	US 5808767	
64	US 5802492	
65	US 5796945	
66	US 5794059	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
67			US 5774357 A	19980630	97
68			US 5751286 A	19980512	26
69			US 5734921 A	19980331	68
70			US 5717943 A	19980210	71
71			US 5710935 A	19980120	66
72			US 5689799 A	19971118	38
73			US 5635978 A	19970603	32
74			US 5625836 A	19970429	67
75			US 5590345 A	19961231	65
76			US 5589892 A	19961231	97
77			US 5588152 A	19961224	67

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
67	Human factored interface incorporating adaptive pattern recognition based controller apparatus	713/600	348/110; 348/27; 348/734; 712/240; 712/245
68	Image query system and method	345/835	345/838; 345/968; 382/209; 382/220; 382/305; 707/4; 707/6
69	Advanced parallel array processor computer package	712/10	709/238; 712/14; 712/20
70	Advanced parallel array processor (APAP)	712/20	712/14
71	Advanced parallel array processor (APAP)	712/20	711/149; 712/11; 712/15
72	Method and apparatus for routing confidential information	455/2.01	7 127 10
73	Electronic television program guide channel system and method	725/42	348/569; 348/906; 725/40; 725/41; 725/43; 725/44
74	SIMD/MIMD processing memory element (PME)	709/214	711/147; 712/201
75	Advanced parallel array processor(APAP)	712/11	712/14; 712/15
76	Electronic television program guide schedule system and method with data feed access	725/43	345/721; 345/733; 348/564; 348/569; 348/906; 725/45; 725/54; 725/58; 725/60; 725/61
77	Advanced parallel processor including advanced support hardware	712/16	

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
67		Hoffberg, Steven M. et al.	×						
68		Barber, Ronald Jason et al.	\boxtimes						
69		Dapp, Michael Charles et al.	×						
70		Barker, Thomas Norman et al.	×						
71		Barker, Thomas Norman et al.	☒						
72		Dougherty, Brian P. et al.	⊠						
73		Alten, Jerry et al.	×						
74		Barker, Thomas N. et al.	×						
75		Barker, Thomas N. et al.	☒						
76		Knee, Robert A. et al.							
77		Dapp, Michael C. et al.	⊠						

	Image Doc. Displayed	РТ
67	US 5774357	
68	US 5751286	
69	US 5734921	
70	US 5717943	
71	US 5710935	
72	US 5689799	
73	US 5635978	
74	US 5625836	
75	US 5590345	
76	US 5589892	
77	US 5588152	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
78			US 5585866 A	19961217	80
79			US 5579471 A	19961126	26
80			US 5567164 A	19961022	19
81			US 5559707 A	19960924	61
82			US 5559548 A	19960924	36
83			US 5410634 A	19950425	15
84			US 5208745 A	19930504	26
85			US 4931950 A	19900605	25

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
78	Electronic television program guide schedule system and method including virtual channels	725/43	348/570; 348/906; 725/100; 725/101; 725/104; 725/30; 725/61
79	Image query system and method	345/700	345/835; 382/209; 382/220; 382/305; 707/6
80	Method of facilitating learning using a learning complex	434/432	
81	Computer aided routing system	701/200	340/990; 340/995; 701/23; 701/82
82	System and method for generating an information display schedule for an electronic program guide	725/40	348/906; 725/104; 725/36; 725/42; 725/43; 725/48
83	Self-optimizing method and machine	706/62	
84	Multimedia interface and method for computer system	700/83	345/978; 706/10; 706/11; 706/45; 706/911; 707/500.1
85	Multimedia interface and method for computer system	706/11	345/978; 379/908; 381/110; 700/83; 706/45; 707/500.1

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
78		Miller, Larry et al.	×						
79		Barber, Ronald J. et al.	\boxtimes						
80		Durkin, James C. et al.	×		Ó				
81		DeLorme, David M. et al.	\boxtimes						
82		Davis, Bruce et al.	×						
83		Li, Chou H.	×						
84		Quentin, George H. et al.	 						
85		lsle, Brian A. et al.	⊠						

	Image Doc. Displayed	РТ
78	US 5585866	
79	US 5579471	
80	US 5567164	
81	US 5559707	
82	US 5559548	
83	US 5410634	
84	US 5208745	
85	US 4931950	

MIND AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Mihai Draganescu

Professor at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest-Romania

Reprinted from NOESIS, vol.XII, 1986, pp.129-133

In the history of philosophy and of scientific thinking there are known some theories of mind. Among these may be mentioned:

- the monist theory, for which the fundamental reality is mind;
- the dualist theory, for which mind and body are of a different nature;
- the interconnectivity theory, for which the mental activity of the brain is a consequence of the huge number of interconnections among neurones;
- the identity theory, for which "mind is the brain" or "brain is the mind", a theory based on a biological philosophy [1];
- the data processing theory (informatic theory), for which the mind is the software of the brain and for which there is no fundamental difference between natural intelligence (NI) and artificial intelligence (AI);
- the theory of non-existence of the mind, for which the mind is a system of semantic structures (or meaning structures [2]) through which a person is in contact with the physical and social worlds.

Some of these theories have many points in common and, of course other theories may be mentioned or may be advanced.

Perhaps the most important problem to be clarified, both for a theory of mind and for the artificial intelligence theory is the relation between natural and artificial intelligence.

Alan Newell, a well-known scientist and specialist in artificial intelligence, believing many years, together with Herbert Simon, that NI = AI, writes:

"One of the world's deepest mysteries - the nature of mind - is at the centre of AI [...]. Its discovery which will no more be a simple act thant he discovery of the nature of life, or the origins of the universe, will be a major chapter in the scientific advance of mankind. There will be a coherent account of the nature of intelligence, knowledge, intention, desire etc., and how it is possible for the phenomena that cluster under these names to occur in our physical universe" [3].

AI practice cannot solve the mind problem. But it can help to acquire a new understanding of both mind and AI theory.

Concerning, for instance, the modelling of space and time in data-processing programs and in AI programs, Bernard Meltzer, an expert in expert systems, observes that these

programs

"seem to model a ghost, ethereal world in which not only there is no space or time, but not even physical objects: a solipsistic world[...] [4]".

Something is lacking in AI to have all what we know about human mind, i.e.: it has not the feeling of continuity of the objects the man sees, continuity of itself, feeling of continuity of time, intuition, genuine creation and so on. We think that such phenomena are not purely structural, but have components that we call purely phenomenological.


Mind processes are without any doubt, informational processes. We may question only the nature of mental information, in what degree it is identical or similar to the structural information of computers and AI programs.

We may think that in a mind, information has not only structural but also yet unknown phenomenological components. And these phenomenological phenomena (related, in a way, to the phenomenology of Husserl) cannot manifest outside matter, but in a special form of matter, that we called *informatter*. It is not possible to present here all the ontological bases [5][6][7] of such an idea, but for the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to say that any biological body is formed of the usual structural substance and informatter, the latter offering to a mind all what AI has not: continuity and phenomenological senses of which every mind is aware.

If we take this theses (I) as an initial point, we may derive a lot of consequences, shortly presented as follows:

- II. Mental information has both structural and phenomenological components.
- III. The brain is both structural-physical (the usual body) and phenomenological-physical, that is the brain is physical and alive, that is biological.
- IV. The brain is a substratum for structural-phenomenological informational processes.
- V. The mind is the entire informational activity of the brain, structural and phenomenological.
- VI. Mind is not the brain, but the brain contains the mind.
- VII. The brain is therefore a physical-informational device.

AI has nothing phenomenological (in the sense explained above). Being intelligent, an AI system has a psychology but its psychology is not mental in itself. AI offers only an illusion of a mental psychology, although, we must recognise, sometimes, a very good illusion.



A criterion might be the test of creativity, but this is delicate even for NI; otherwise, to ask where a piece of knowledge is placed inside the intelligent system (artificial or natural). An AI system will point to some locations of memory. A man cannot indicate such location. It may be objected that man has an associative memory and has not sensors for his own brain, but we think that it is not only this, because the brain cannot be reduced only to the network of neurons, also cannot be reduced to its molecules, especially those inside the neurones, which may have a role in the computational processes of the brain. If we take into account its informaterial component, this one not having a spatial character, the mental processes will never have a totally spatial localisation. Some philosophical systems of antiquity spoke, perhaps not without reason, about infinity of mind.

Never will a non-mental intelligence say like Anna de Noaille:

"Je t'avais regardé. Le regard est un contact plus nete et dur que le mineral. C'est un chosc qui ebranle deux esprits..."[8].

Never will a non-alive artificial intelligence transmit or receive something from mental to mental, as in the above example, a reciprocal mirroring of the eyes of two beings.

Some considerations concerning the human mind may be drawn from a theory of a problem [9] suggested by the Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga.

Some other considerations concerning the human mind may be deduced from Kant's theory of intellect and reason, and in summary we may say that AI has not reason in the kantian sense, only a human may have this reason, or in the future an alive AI.

In fact, we think that a structural-phenomenological theory of mind is possible, which might explain the similarities and the differences between AI and NI.

We may say that the semantics of AI is only structural, and the semantics of NI is structural-phenomenological.

Ignoring phenomenological processes in mental thinking has far reaching consequences. The phenomenological processes may have a non-formal character, the structural processes, by definition, are formal, in the last instance are computational. If we conceive only a structural reality, this reality is then a computational process. The Universe, man and society would be computational processes.

If we recognise the phenomenological processes, the physical universe may still be a computational process, but not the man and not the society, although man and society have a great part of formal in them.

We are faced with two philosophical possibilities:

- a) Either we recognise (like the science of today, especially physics and biology) only structural processes and then the entire reality is a computational process.
- b) Or we recognise both structural and phenomenological processes as distinct and correlated, and then the reality is not entirely a computational process.

Michael Conrad, an emerging scientist in molecular computing, talking about the Turing-Church thesis on computability gives it the following interpretation:

"any system or process physically realisable must be effectively computable" [10].

By "effectively computable" one understands computable by a formal process with a succession of simple operations on strings of symbols, as it is the case, for instance, of a data-processing program. Conrad's extended thesis says that any realisable physical process is equivalent to a computation, even if is not effectively computable. Perhaps, at the molecular level, the brain succeeds to make computations that even if they are not of the effective type, they are still formal computations. Let us call *integrated computations* these noneffective computations. But taking place at the molecular level they are also structural and they cannot explain mind phenomena, although may be very powerful in computing and heuristics.

The first philosophical position (a) cannot explain mind phenomena. Today, neither physics nor information science can neglect mental phenomena, which are present in various forms perhaps in every biological body, under the form of structural-phenomenological processes. A mental process is essential in every living organism in order to have the phenomenological unity which is recognised, by biologists, above the structural unity of the body.

The mental is a fundamental phenomenon in the living matter and the recognition of this assertion is compatible, in our opinion, with the second (b) proposed philosophical position (which recognises a structural-phenomenological reality). Only the structural part of reality is computational.

Although the physical universe may be born by specific phenomenological-structural processes, the physical universe, if alone, is structural and remains and remains a computational process obeying the laws of physics.

The biological universe is not only structural, and in this second approximation even the physical universe is influenced by the mental behaviour of living organisms.

Living organisms, especially man, because of the great structural-phenomenological possibilities, have a huge informational disponibility. The human mind, being also phenomenological, is not determined completely by the laws of physics and biology.



We do not think that we might recognise *information* as a fundamental process in matter if we do not recognise phenomenological information. The structural information alone may be seen as a structural physical process. In such a case man would be determined by the laws of physics, society also.

We think that information may be taken into consideration, for the Universe, along with the four fundamental forces of physics. Concerning the profound matter from which the Universe emerged, the phenomenological information may remain the only fundamental phenomenon.

For man, information is added to the laws of physics to become man, and information is added to the laws of physics to make possible the society. And if information exists under structural form due to its initial phenomenological basis, then society could not be deeply explained without the fundamental existence of phenomenological information.

Therefore, contrary to the opinion that the entire world is working like a computer, an opinion accepted even by some philosopher like A.Sloman [11], we think that the world is working like a computer but not quite. We believe that philosophy and science too, may become structural-phenomenological one day.

Bibliography

- 1. D.O.Hebb, Essay on mind, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980.
- 2. Lars-Gunnar Lundh, Mind and meaning. Towards a theory of the human mind considered as a system of meaning structures. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 10, Upsala, 1983.
- 3. Alan Newell in eds. D.G.Bobrow and Patrick J.Hayes, *Artificial Intelligence: where are we?*, Artificial Intelligence, vol.25, 1985, p.377.
- 4. Bernard Meltzer, in eds D.G.Bobrow and P.J.Hayes, op.cit. p.406.
- 5. Mihai Drãgãnescu, *Profunzimile lumii materiale* (The Depths of the Material World, Bucharest, Ed.Politicã, 1979.*
- 6. Mihai Drãgãnescu, *Information, Heuristis, Creation*, in the volume I.Plander (Ed.) ,Artificial Intelligence and Information, *Control Systems of Robots*, Elsevier (North-Holland), 1984, pp.25-29.**
- 7. Mihai Drãgãnescu, Ortofizica (Orthophysics), Bucharest, Ed.Stiintifica si Enciclopedicã, 1985.
- 8. Anna de Noaille, Exactitudes, Paris, Grasset, 2e édition, 1930, p,60.

- 9. Lucian Blaga, *Opere*, (Works), vol.8, 1983, p.99-107; 337-441; 365-371; works reprinted after the originals from 1933 and 1947).
- 10. Michael Conrad, On design principles for a molecular computer, Communications of the ACM, vol.28, 1985, May, p.465.
- 11. Aaron Sloman, *The computer revolution in philosophy: philosophy science and models of mind*, Hassocks, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978.

Notes (February 17, 1997).

- * With an English edition on the web, *The Depths of Existence*, Bucharest, 1997, http://www.racai.ro/books/doe.
- ** See also on the author's Web-site:
 http://www.racai.ro/~ncristin/MD-Web/mdraganescu.html

dragam@yalhalla.racai.ro



Matching Results About This

1-15 of 26700 < Previous 15 | Next 15 >

1. right frame

... which, for us, clarifies and penetrates the meanings of natural and phenomenological ... which admit of being part of nature have unquestionable data. ... http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/phenom/saleem...

2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND COGNITION RESEARCH GROUP

... experienced), and therefore first-person data ... Phenomenological characterizations (descriptions) = phenomenological properties as ... P is attributed to a natural ... http://heraclite.ens.fr/~roy/phenogro...

3. Data, Theory, and Evolutionary Phenomena. Origins & Design 17:2. ...

... includes a dogmatic commitment to the power of natural ... of falling bodies [d= gt2] is a phenomenological law, a phenomenon Galileo inferred from relevant data ... http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od172...

4. "Access to Another Mind: Naturalistic Theories Require ...

... be highlighted: Only through evolutionarily-informed natural ... ought to be based on naturalistic data and that alternative methods for studying phenomenological ... http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v5/psy...

5. Perspectives on Rsch page 6

... 6. AN EXAMPLE COMPARING A NATURAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO A HUMAN ... has included not only quantitative data but qualitative, phenomenological data ... http://clem.mscd.edu/~davisj/prm2/per...

6. Geophysical Databases

... of the scientific domain of interest (eg, in natural ... We also have obtained the data sets and used ... many global climate models in terms of the phenomenological ... http://sdcd.gsfc.nasa.gov/ESS/annual....

7. Death & Dying from an Observational, Phenomenological, & ...

... Hermeneutic data collection comes from various sources and ... The use of the observational, phenomenological, and ... a number of perspectives to examine the natural ... http://www.lutz-sanfilippo.com/lsfd&d...

8. Phenomenological Model for Gas Damping of High-Speed Switches

... ABSTRACT This paper discusses a simple phenomenological ... Comparisons are made with experimental data. ... mechanical switches require structures with high natural ... http://www.comppub.com/publications/M...

9. 20th WCP: A Phenomenological Reply to Berkeley's 'Water ...

Theory of Knowledge. A Phenomenological Reply to Berkeley's ... to suggest that it is reducible to sense data ... prejudices, the so-called 'assumptions of the natural ... http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKn...

10. Phenomenological description of the electronic structure


... not sufficient in the case of limited experimental data. Simplified phenomenological models had been in use ... He followed a natural and simple idea, according ... http://www.int.pan.wroc.pl/zgajek/Phe...

11. Matrix population models without the matrix When in doubt, smooth

... 13 When in doubt, smooth * If there are no natural ... what you don't. * More accurate prediction, than either phenomenological ... 1/99 14 Can it work with real data? ... http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/Ellner/bes...

12. Molecular Simulation of the Thermodynamic Properties of Natural ...

... to predict the observed field behavior in natural ... to simulations we discuss the development of a phenomenological representation of the data ... http://www.campublic.co.uk/science/pu...





13. Intelligent Information Systems V

... We intend to explain the difference between "natural" and ... Starting from the phenomenological reduction context of observation we can understand data flow ... http://www.ipipan.waw.pl/libr/abstr.htm

14. 1996 Symposium

... transient dynamics for our understanding of natural ... Comparing phenomenological, mechanistic, and semi-mechanistic models for epidemic dynamics data ... http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/theor_ecol/...

15. Environmental Programs Photochemical Model Ozone Forecasting

... the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural ... yield little in the way of overall phenomenological ... the numerical air quality prediction (NAQP) data ... http://www.emc.mcnc.org/services/real...

powered G(

1-15 of 26700 < Previous 15 | Next 15 >



husserl's positive argument and phenomenology Saleem Waraich

Phenomena are mental events. They are limited to consciousness, and thus phenomenology is, though not limited to, the science of consciousness. A precise formulation of the positive argument, along with penetration into the meanings of key concepts, will reward an exact definition of phenomenology. Among other things, it will be found that Husserl's account of phenomenology is not in accord with the standard textbook gloss.

Nature is considered a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to universal, precise, generalizing laws. Naturalism is the science that takes advantage of the fact that nature is a unity. It makes use of the fact that nature is explainable, that laws govern its actions, and attempts to discover and formulate those laws. One way of stating the positive argument is to call naturalism naïve. More specifically, it is naïve is regard to its point of departure. When it sets off to discover the laws by which an object is governed, it assumes the object is a part of nature. It thinks the object is a part of the unity of spatio-temporal being and thus subject to universal, precise, generalizing laws. Husserl wants to say that not everything is best considered as nature. The object domain of naturalism is limited. It's limited to objects of nature. Consciousness is not nature. Experience as consciousness does not give or contact an object. Experiences in consciousness do not mutually legitimate and correct each other the way objects of nature do. Consciousness is special. Naturalism has no business studying consciousness. Phenomenology does. In summary: 1) Nature is a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact, universal laws. 2) Naturalism should naturalize objects of nature only. 3) Consciousness is not an object of nature and 4) therefore natural science cannot study consciousness.

Naturalism however, has been studying consciousness. It has been studying the "natural" aspects of consciousness through psychology. This leads us to a consequence of the positive argument which, for us, clarifies and penetrates the meanings of natural and phenomenological investigations. In doing so it will be made known that phenomena are mental events, that is, are events in consciousness. Objects which admit of being part of nature have unquestionable data. A backpack weighs a certain amount, has a certain texture, and can hold a certain load. Similarly, consciousness can be thought of as containing certain unquestionable data. The aim of natural science would then be to know this unquestionable data in an objectively valid, scientific manner. Perception could thus be thought of as neuronal events in which transmitters stimulate receptors. The corresponding electrical and chemical data are unquestionable. Remember, natural science obtains this data from objects which are themselves physical, or a part of the spatio-temporal unity of nature. This is crucial. Naturalism concerns itself with dependencies that are physical. Phenomenology does not! A phenomena is not in any way physical. As Husserl says, "A phenomena is no substantial unity; it has no real properties, it knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality." (106) Phenomena are precisely those things which are not physical and do not have unquestionable data. It now becomes apparent why phenomena are not meant to be naturalized. They necessarily have nothing to do with the physical. They're mental, With regard to the characterization of a phenomenological investigation there are definitive consequences. Their data is questionable. There are no instruments with which one can measure and interpret their nature. They are events in consciousness and our consciousness is the only tool we have to get at their nature. While natural science aims to know unquestionable data in an objectively valid, scientific manner, phenomenology aims to know questionable data. Phenomenology studies the questionable data of events that occur in the realm of consciousness. If phenomenology studies objects, it does so only after they appear in consciousness. An object after it has appeared in consciousness is what we will can a

phenomenon and we do so because it must lack relation to the physical. A phenomenological investigation concerns itself with the non-physical, and the questionable. Furthermore, the only tool, or instrument with which the non-physical and questionable can be analized is consciousness.

I want to say this poses a problem. I will formulate the problem, then attempt to solve it. In solving it I will come to a definition of phenomenology in contrast to the standard textbook gloss. If phenomenology investigates objects whose relations to the physical are ignored it stands on shaky ground. The physical is real. The physical is tangible and safe. It provides us with a definitive way to characterize and understand objects. To reject an object's relation to the physical seems to be asking for trouble. To make it worse, the objects aren't even treated as objects. They're considered as mental events! That is to say they are considered as representations of objects in the theater of our minds. A phenomenologist investigates questionable properties in the highly subjective and personal realm of consciousness! This is exactly the picture laid by the standard textbook gloss. All phenomenology can do is describe feeble, fleeting, and personal events in consciousness. It seems impossible to say such a theory would lay solid foundations for philosophy as rigorous science. But yet Husserl takes note of this seemingly weak conception of phenomenology: one would "have before its eyes only being as the correlate of consciousness." (89) Foundation and solidity would be lost in spheres of representation. Here we make a claim. If phenomenology is to hold ground as a legitimate science phenomena must not be viewed as finding its origin in consciousness. Phenomena appear in consciousness. They are separate from consciousness. Husserl clarifies further just what an phenomenological investigation entails. We already know it will not be seeking objectively valid data. It will have nothing to do with the physical and must in some way grasp the essence of an unusual object; an object that "has no real parts", "no substantial unity" and that appears in consciousness: "the investigation must be directed towards a scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, towards that which consciousness itself is,... toward what consciousness means, as well as toward the different ways... it intends the objective." (89)

How are phenomena to be understood? By knowledge of the consciousness in which they appear. Phenomenology concerns itself with knowledge of what consciousness "is", as opposed to how it seems to us to be. It strives for essential knowledge of consciousness. Consciousness is also thought to hold meaning. In finding what consciousness "means" it gets at the root of experience and attempts to make a claim as to its significance. Phenomenology then finds knowledge of what consciousness means, as opposed to what it can be thought to say nothing about. In finding how it "intends the objective" it makes claims as to whether or not consciousness faithfully paints our understanding of unquestionable data, or if it does so with a great deal of uncertainty. Phenomenology does not intend the subjective. It does not merely investigate how my consciousness is different from yours. It thus finds the laws by which experience as consciousness is separate from mere opinions. Phenomenology then does not lay foundations for philosophy by focusing on all the variables involved with consciousness. Only after and during the acquisition of this knowledge can knowledge of the phenomenon itself be acquired. The phenomena and the consciousness in which they appear are the object domain of phenomenology. This both legitimates and substantiates phenomenology. It legitimates it in so far as phenomenology is not thought to deal with subjective objects that are seen through the subjective haze of consciousness, but rather to deal with non-physical characteristics of an object appearing, vet separate from, an analyzable consciousness. It substantiates phenomenology in so far that it can be thought of as having a purpose. It purposes to know what consciousness is and means.

Natural science cannot study consciousness because consciousness is not nature. Phenomenology will study consciousness. An object, after is appears in consciousness is a phenomenon. A phenomenological investigation concerns itself with the non-physical, and the questionable. Though consciousness is the only tool we have to get at this type of data, this in no way gives us a weak conception of phenomenology for a number of reasons: 1) Phenomena do not find their origin in consciousness. They appear in, yet are separate from consciousness. 2) The phenomena and the consciousness in which they appear are the

object domain of phenomenology. Phenomenology concerns itself with consciousness. Consciousness is held to be analyzable and one major task of phenomenology is to obtain knowledge of what consciousness is. 3) Consciousness if thought to hold meaning and, 4) Phenomenology aims to know the ways in which experience as consciousness intends the objective. Phenomenology is not the descriptive science of consciousness. It does not merely describe consciousness, nor does it describe the way objects, or phenomena, seem. Phenomenology is the science of non-physical mental events treated as entities separate from, but appearing in, an analyzable consciousness.

husserl's positive argument and phenomenology Saleem Waraich

Phenomena are mental events. They are limited to consciousness, and thus phenomenology is, though not limited to, the science of consciousness. A precise formulation of the positive argument, along with penetration into the meanings of key concepts, will reward an exact definition of phenomenology. Among other things, it will be found that Husserl's account of phenomenology is not in accord with the standard textbook gloss.

Nature is considered a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to universal, precise, generalizing laws. Naturalism is the science that takes advantage of the fact that nature is a unity. It makes use of the fact that nature is explainable, that laws govern its actions, and attempts to discover and formulate those laws. One way of stating the positive argument is to call naturalism naïve. More specifically, it is naïve is regard to its point of departure. When it sets off to discover the laws by which an object is governed, it assumes the object is a part of nature. It thinks the object is a part of the unity of spatio-temporal being and thus subject to universal, precise, generalizing laws. Husserl wants to say that not everything is best considered as nature. The object domain of naturalism is limited. It's limited to objects of nature. Consciousness is not nature. Experience as consciousness does not give or contact an object. Experiences in consciousness do not mutually legitimate and correct each other the way objects of nature do. Consciousness is special. Naturalism has no business studying consciousness. Phenomenology does. In summary: 1) Nature is a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact, universal laws. 2) Naturalism should naturalize objects of nature only. 3) Consciousness is not an object of nature and 4) therefore natural science cannot study consciousness.

Naturalism however, has been studying consciousness. It has been studying the "natural" aspects of consciousness through psychology. This leads us to a consequence of the positive argument which, for us, clarifies and penetrates the meanings of natural and phenomenological investigations. In doing so it will be made known that phenomena are mental events, that is, are events in consciousness. Objects which admit of being part of nature have unquestionable data. A backpack weighs a certain amount, has a certain texture, and can hold a certain load. Similarly, consciousness can be thought of as containing certain unquestionable data. The aim of natural science would then be to know this unquestionable data in an objectively valid, scientific manner. Perception could thus be thought of as neuronal events in which transmitters stimulate receptors. The corresponding electrical and chemical data are unquestionable. Remember, natural science obtains this data from objects which are themselves physical, or a part of the spatio-temporal unity of nature. This is crucial. Naturalism concerns itself with dependencies that are physical. Phenomenology does not! A phenomena is not in any way physical. As Husserl says, "A phenomena is no substantial unity; it has no real properties, it knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality." (106) Phenomena are precisely those things which are not physical and do not have unquestionable data. It now becomes apparent why phenomena are not meant to be naturalized. They necessarily have nothing to do with the physical. They're mental. With regard to the characterization of a phenomenological investigation there are definitive consequences. Their data is questionable. There are no instruments with which one can measure and interpret their nature. They are events in consciousness and our consciousness is the only tool we have to get at their nature. While natural science aims to know unquestionable data in an objectively valid, scientific manner, phenomenology aims to know questionable data. Phenomenology studies the questionable data of events that occur in the realm of consciousness. If phenomenology studies objects, it does so only after they appear in consciousness. An object after it has appeared in consciousness is what we will can a

phenomenon and we do so because it must lack relation to the physical. A phenomenological investigation concerns itself with the non-physical, and the questionable. Furthermore, the only tool, or instrument with which the non-physical and questionable can be analized is consciousness.

I want to say this poses a problem. I will formulate the problem, then attempt to solve it. In solving it I will come to a definition of phenomenology in contrast to the standard textbook gloss. If phenomenology investigates objects whose relations to the physical are ignored it stands on shaky ground. The physical is real. The physical is tangible and safe. It provides us with a definitive way to characterize and understand objects. To reject an object's relation to the physical seems to be asking for trouble. To make it worse, the objects aren't even treated as objects. They're considered as mental events! That is to say they are considered as representations of objects in the theater of our minds. A phenomenologist investigates questionable properties in the highly subjective and personal realm of consciousness! This is exactly the picture laid by the standard textbook gloss. All phenomenology can do is describe feeble, fleeting, and personal events in consciousness. It seems impossible to say such a theory would lay solid foundations for philosophy as rigorous science. But yet Husserl takes note of this seemingly weak conception of phenomenology: one would "have before its eyes only being as the correlate of consciousness." (89) Foundation and solidity would be lost in spheres of representation. Here we make a claim. If phenomenology is to hold ground as a legitimate science phenomena must not be viewed as finding its origin in consciousness. Phenomena appear in consciousness. They are separate from consciousness. Husserl clarifies further just what an phenomenological investigation entails. We already know it will not be seeking objectively valid data. It will have nothing to do with the physical and must in some way grasp the essence of an unusual object; an object that "has no real parts", "no substantial unity" and that appears in consciousness: "the investigation must be directed towards a scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, towards that which consciousness itself is,... toward what consciousness means, as well as toward the different ways... it intends the objective." (89)

How are phenomena to be understood? By knowledge of the consciousness in which they appear. Phenomenology concerns itself with knowledge of what consciousness "is", as opposed to how it seems to us to be. It strives for essential knowledge of consciousness. Consciousness is also thought to hold meaning. In finding what consciousness "means" it gets at the root of experience and attempts to make a claim as to its significance. Phenomenology then finds knowledge of what consciousness means, as opposed to what it can be thought to say nothing about. In finding how it "intends the objective" it makes claims as to whether or not consciousness faithfully paints our understanding of unquestionable data, or if it does so with a great deal of uncertainty. Phenomenology does not intend the subjective. It does not merely investigate how my consciousness is different from yours. It thus finds the laws by which experience as consciousness is separate from mere opinions. Phenomenology then does not lay foundations for philosophy by focusing on all the variables involved with consciousness. Only after and during the acquisition of this knowledge can knowledge of the phenomenon itself be acquired. The phenomena and the consciousness in which they appear are the object domain of phenomenology. This both legitimates and substantiates phenomenology. It legitimates it in so far as phenomenology is not thought to deal with subjective objects that are seen through the subjective haze of consciousness, but rather to deal with non-physical characteristics of an object appearing, yet separate from, an analyzable consciousness. It substantiates phenomenology in so far that it can be thought of as having a purpose. It purposes to know what consciousness is and means.

Natural science cannot study consciousness because consciousness is not nature. Phenomenology will study consciousness. An object, after is appears in consciousness is a phenomenon. A phenomenological investigation concerns itself with the non-physical, and the questionable. Though consciousness is the only tool we have to get at this type of data, this in no way gives us a weak conception of phenomenology for a number of reasons: 1) Phenomena do not find their origin in consciousness. They appear in, yet are separate from consciousness. 2) The phenomena and the consciousness in which they appear are the

object domain of phenomenology. Phenomenology concerns itself with consciousness. Consciousness is held to be analyzable and one major task of phenomenology is to obtain knowledge of what consciousness is. 3) Consciousness if thought to hold meaning and, 4) Phenomenology aims to know the ways in which experience as consciousness intends the objective. Phenomenology is not the descriptive science of consciousness. It does not merely describe consciousness, nor does it describe the way objects, or phenomena, seem. Phenomenology is the science of non-physical mental events treated as entities separate from, but appearing in, an analyzable consciousness.

L Number	Hits	Search Text	DB	Time stamp
1	10	weather and database and multimedia and grid\$4 and	USPAT:	2002/06/10 13:10
		(satellite and database and multimedia) and (radar and	US-PGPUB	
		database and multimedia)		
2	4	weather and database and multimedia and gridded and	USPAT;	2002/06/10 13:12
		database and multimedia	LIS-POPLIB	

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	☒						
2		White, Chris M. et al.	×						
3		Burfeind, Craig et al.	⊠						
4		Barros, Barbara L.	⊠						

	Image Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 6392664	
3	US 6360172	
4	US 6307573	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1		☒	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
2	×	☒	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	-
2	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	P	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	\boxtimes						
2	,	Burfeind, Craig et al.							

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 6360172	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1	\boxtimes	⊠	US 20020069020 A1	20020696	
2	\boxtimes	⊠	US 6392664 B1	20020521	12
3	⊠	☒	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	
2	Method and system for presenting television programming and interactive entertainment	345/717	345/719; 345/733; 345/758; 348/552; 725/112; 725/113; 725/136; 725/61
3	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.							
2		White, Chris M. et al.							
3		Burfeind, Craig et al.							

	lmage Doc. Displayed	PT
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 6392664	
3	US 6360172	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1		⊠	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
2			US 20010003846 A1	20010614	58
3		\boxtimes	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29
4			US 6169954 B1	20010102	32
5			US 6105060 A	20000815	18
6			US 5991735 A	19991123	30
7			US 5950543 A	19990914	40
8			US 5875108 A	19990223	110
9			US 5848396 A	19981208	31
10			US 5774357 A	19980630	97

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	
2	Encapsulated, streaming media automation and distribution system	725/47	725/87
3	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414
4	Intelligent public transit system using dual-mode vehicles	701/117	701/23
5	System for providing global portable internet access using low earth orbit satellite and satellite direct radio broadcast system	709/219	725/63
6	Computer program apparatus for determining behavioral profile of a computer user	705/10	705/1
7	Evacuated tube transport	104/138.1	104/130.05; 104/27; 104/28
8	Ergonomic man-machine interface incorporating adaptive pattern recognition based control system	700/17	382/181; 382/190; 700/83
9	Method and apparatus for determining behavioral profile of a computer user	705/10	705/1; 725/14; 725/46
10	Human factored interface incorporating adaptive pattern recognition based controller apparatus	713/600	348/110; 348/27; 348/734; 712/240; 712/245

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	\boxtimes						
2		Rowe, Lynn T. et al.	×						
3		Burfeind, Craig et al.	☒						
4		McCrary, Homer T.	☒						
5		Rothblatt, Martine A.	×						
6		Gerace, Thomas A.	Ø						
7		Oster, Daryl	\boxtimes						
8		Hoffberg, Steven M. et al.	×						
9		Gerace, Thomas A.	☒						
10		Hoffberg, Steven M. et al.	⊠						

	Image Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 20010003846	
3	US 6360172	
4	US 6169954	
5	US 6105060	
6	US 5991735	
7	US 5950543	
8	US 5875108	
9	US 5848396	
10	US 5774357	

L Number	Hits	Search Text	DB	
2	2	(phenomenologic\$3) with (grid\$4 and (metrological or	USPAT:	Time stamp
		weather))	US-PGPUB	2002/06/10 17:36
3	2	(phenomenologic\$3) and (grid\$4 and (metrological or	USPAT:	2002/06/40 47:40
		(weather))	US-PGPUB	2002/06/10 17:40
1	4	weather and database and multimedia and gridded and	USPAT:	2002/06/10 17:46
		database and multimedia	US-PGPUB	2002/00/10 17.46
4	2	(phenomenologic\$3) and (grid\$4 and (metrological or	USPAT:	2002/06/10 17:41
_		weather)) and server	US-PGPUB	2002/00/10 17.41
5	56	weather and database and multimedia and grid\$4 and	USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:42
8		database and multimedia	US-PGPUB	
•	3	Meteorological and weather and data\$4 and multimedia and	USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:46
		grid\$3	US-PGPUB	

L Number	Hits	Search Text	DB	T:
2	2	(phenomenologic\$3) with (grid\$4 and (metrological or		Time stamp
	- 1	weather))	USPAT; US-PGPUB	2002/06/10 17:36
3	2	(phenomenologic\$3) and (grid\$4 and (metrological or weather))	USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:40
1	4	weather and database and multimedia and gridded and	US-PGPUB USPAT;	2002/06/10 17:37
4	2	database and multimedia (phenomenologic\$3) and (grid\$4 and (metrological or	US-PGPUB USPAT:	2002/06/10 17:41
	i	weather)) and server	USEAT,	2002/00/10 17:41

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1		×	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
2		⊠	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	
2	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	×						
2		Burfeind, Craig et al.							

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 6360172	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1		Ø	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
2		⊠	US 6392664 B1	20020521	12
3	⊠	☒	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29
4	☒	⊠	US 6307573 B1	20011023	41

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	
2	Method and system for presenting television programming and interactive entertainment	345/717	345/719; 345/733; 345/758; 348/552; 725/112; 725/113; 725/136; 725/61
3	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414
4	Graphic-information flow method and system for visually analyzing patterns and relationships	345/764	345/440; 345/803; 345/804; 345/854; 705/26; 707/512

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	S	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	×						
2		White, Chris M. et al.	×						
3		Burfeind, Craig et al.							
4		Barros, Barbara L.							

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 6392664	
3	US 6360172	
4	US 6307573	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1		☒	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
2			US 20010003846 A1	20010614	58
3		⊠	US 6360172 B1	20020319	29

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef
1	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2	
2	Encapsulated, streaming media automation and distribution system	725/47	725/87
3	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural-phenomenological information	702/2	455/414

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Burfeind, Craig et al.	×						
2		Rowe, Lynn T. et al.	\boxtimes						
3		Burfeind, Craig et al.	×						

06/10/2002, EAST Version: 1.03.0002

	lmage Doc. Displayed	РТ
1	US 20020069020	
2	US 20010003846	
3	US 6360172	

	U	1	Document ID	Issue Date	Pages
1			US 20020069220 A1	20020606	55
2		⊠	US 20020069020 A1	20020606	28
3			US 20020065585 A1	20020530	35
4			US 20020060750 A1	20020523	38
5			US 20020059148 A1	20020516	20
6			US 20020056083 A1	20020509	26
7			US 20020042747 A1	20020411	23
8			US 20020035726 A1	20020321	14
9			US 20020035497 A1	20020321	9
10			US 20020026496 A1	20020228	24
11			US 20020018124 A1	20020214	16
12			US 20010029410 A1	20011011	35
13			US 20010021887 A1	20010913	28
14			US 20010020202 A1	20010906	28
15			US 20010003846 A1	20010614	58
16			US 6392664 B1	20020521	12

	Title	Current OR	Current XRef			
1	REMOTE DATA ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UTILIZING HANDWRITING INPUT	707/503				
2	Generation and distribution of personalized multimedia natural phenomenological information	702/2				
3	Multimedia information and control system for automobiles	701/1				
4	Single-button remote access to a synthetic channel page of specialized content	348/569	725/38; 725/51			
5	Telecommunications initiated data fulfillment system	705/77				
6	System and method for picture-in-browser scaling	725/1				
7	Automatic prompting for printer ink refill	705/26	705/14; 705/27			
8	Information descriptor and extended information descriptor data structures for digital television signals	725/39				
9	System and method for utility enterprise management	705/7				
10	ELECTRONIC-MAIL REMINDER FOR AN INTERNET TELEVISION PROGRAM GUIDE	709/218				
11	Methods and systems for networked camera control	348/211	348/14.03			
12	Multimedia information and control system for automobiles	701/1				
13	Multimedia information and control system for automobiles	701/1	701/36			
14	Multimedia information and control system for automobiles	701/1	701/211			
15	Encapsulated, streaming media automation and distribution system	725/47	725/87			
16	Method and system for presenting television programming and interactive entertainment	345/717	345/719; 345/733; 345/758; 348/552; 725/112; 725/113; 725/136; 725/61			

	Retrieval Classif	Inventor	s	С	Р	2	3	4	5
1		Tran, Bao Q.	×						
2		Burfeind, Craig et al.	×						
3		Obradovich, Michael L.	×						
4		Istvan, Anthony F. et al.	\boxtimes						
5		Rosenhaft, Matthew et al.	×						
6	:	Istvan, Anthony F.	×						
7		Istvan, Anthony F.	⊠						
8		Corl, Mark T.	\boxtimes						
9		Mazereeuw, Jeff et al.	Ø						
10		BOYER, FRANKLIN E. et al.	\boxtimes						
11		Mottur, Peter A. et al.	Ø						
12		Obradovich, Michael L.	☒						
13		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.	⊠						
14		Obradovich, Michael L. et al.	☒						
15		Rowe, Lynn T. et al.	☒						
16		White, Chris M. et al.							